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Securing the Right to Reimbursement Under
the Education for All Handicapped
Children Act
This term the Supreme Court can resolve a dispute dividing the
circuits over the scope of "appropriate" monetary relief authorized
under the Education for All Handicapped Children Act ("EHA" or
"the Act")' and in the process safeguard the statutory rights of
handicapped children. The Court has granted certiorari in Town of
Burlington v. Massachusetts Department of Education2 to decide whether
parents are entitled to reimbursement of the costs of private school-
ing of their handicapped child where they believed that the offered
public schooling was inadequate and the parents' decision is subse-
quently upheld in an administrative proceeding.
The EHA guarantees to all physically, mentally and psychologi-
cally handicapped children the right to a free and appropriate public
education; the Act guarantees parents procedural rights to partici-
pate in and challenge school placements of their handicapped chil-
dren. The EHA also gives state and federal courts the authority to
review a school district's placement decision and to "grant such re-
lief as the court determines is appropriate." 3
The First Circuit in Town of Burlington interpreted the EHA as al-
lowing reimbursement of tuition and related expenses incurred by
1. Education for All Handicapped Children Act, §§ 602-61, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-61
(1982) (hereinafter cited as EHA]. The EHA guarantees all handicapped children the
right to a "free and appropriate public education." 20 U.S.C. § 1401 (1982).
2. Town of Burlington v. Mass. Dep't of Educ., 736 F.2d 773 (1st Cir. 1984), cert.
granted sub nom, School Committee of the Town of Burlington, Mass. v. Mass. Dep't of
Educ., 53 U.S.L.W. 3372 (U.S. Nov. 13, 1984) (No. 84-433).
In Town of Burlington, the parents of a learning-disabled child enrolled their son in a
private school because they believed the alternative placement offered by the town to be
inadequate. A state hearing officer upheld the private placement and ordered the town
to reimburse the parents for past expenses and to commence funding the private school-
ing. A federal district court upheld this order, but on appeal the First Circuit remanded
the case for consideration of the town's claim that the order violated § 1415(e)(2) of the
EHA. (For the contents of § 1415 (e)(2), see infra note 7). On remand, the district court
reversed the state's determination, holding that the town's placement was appropriate
and adequate. The parents were required to repay the town for all costs relating to the
child's private education. The First Circuit held that the town was required to reimburse
the parents for the period from the state agency's placement decision through the dis-
trict court's reversal and that the parents were not required to reimburse the town. The
town's appeal of this decision is now before the Court. The Massachusetts Department
of Education and the parents are joined as respondents in this case.
3. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) (1982).
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parents pending the outcome of administrative and judicial reviews
in their favor.4 It thus adopted a more expansive view of the relief
contemplated under the Act than have other circuits. The courts
have uniformly rejected claims for punitive damages under the Act, 5
and most have also rejected claims for reimbursement. These latter
courts have thereby limited their statutory role as ultimate guardi-
ans of the EHA-mandated right of handicapped children to "a free
and appropriate public education."
While EHA reimbursement disputes take a variety of forms, the
following scenario distills many of their common characteristics:
Karen, age nine, suffers from severe academic and emotional diffi-
culties. A team of educators and school psychologists diagnoses her
to be learning disabled but not retarded. The school district has no
program designed for children with Karen's disability and therefore
determines that she should be placed in a class for the mentally re-
tarded. On the advice of private specialists, Karen's parents argue
that her learning disabilities demand a different educational setting
and that placement in a program for the mentally retarded will
cause her intellectual and emotional harm. They appeal the school
agency's decision, commencing a two-year process that involves
multiple layers of administrative review up to the federal district
court. Meanwhile, the parents face the choice of placing their
daughter in what they consider to be the damaging setting of the
public school class for the mentally retarded or of enrolling her at
their own expense in a private program designed for children with
her handicap. They opt for the latter. Two years later, the federal
district court determines that the school district's proposal was in-
deed inappropriate, that Karen properly belonged in the private
program that she has since been attending, and that the EHA re-
quires the school district to fund the private placement. Paradoxi-
cally, the court also determines that, although the school agency
should have funded Karen's private schooling from the start, her
parents are not entitled to reimbursement for the sum that they
have expended on her education. That is because they enrolled her
in the private school without the agency's consent prior to the com-
pletion of the judicial review.
This result would be even more unfair if Karen's parents could
4. Town of Burlington, 736 F.2d at 795-99.
5. See, e.g., Anderson v. Thompson, 658 F.2d 1205, 1213 n.12 (7th Cir. 1981); Wil-
liam S. v. Gill, 536 F.Supp. 505 (N.D. Il1. 1982); Loughran v. Flanders, 470 F.Supp. 110,
115 (D. Conn. 1979). See also, Note, Educational Malpractice and Special Education Law, 55
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 685 (1979).
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not have afforded the private school tuition. Then they would have
been forced to leave her in public school until the court determined
two years later that they had been right all along. In such a case,
Karen would probably be denied any compensation for the loss of
an appropriate education, even if the school district had acted in
bad faith to thwart an appropriate but costlier placement. The
school would have saved two years of tuition, while Karen might
have suffered significant educational losses. These examples, reflec-
tive of the law in nearly all the circuits, illustrate the federal courts'
general unwillingness to fashion a reimbursement remedy under the
EHA.
6
Specifically, courts have relied on two of the Act's provisions in
addressing the issue of retroactive monetary relief: § 1415(e)(2),
7
which provides state and federal courts with jurisdiction to hear
EHA claims and gives them broad authority to grant "appropriate"
relief, and § 1415(e)(3), 8 which provides that the child shall remain
in his current classroom pending the outcome of an administrative
or judicial review of his placement in a special program. Some cir-
cuits have adopted the position that § 1415(e)(2) allows reimburse-
ment under only a few exceptional circumstances; 9 a few others
6. In the past, some handicapped plaintiffs avoided the monetary relief pitfall of the
EHA by suing for relief under either the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 § 504, 29 U.S.C.
§ 794 (1982), or the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). See. e.g., Quack-
enbush v. Johnson City School Dist., 716 F.2d 141 (2nd Cir. 1983), cert. denied 104 S.Ct
1426 (1984)(action under § 1983); Miener v. State of Missouri, 673 F.2d 969 (8th Cir.
1982)(action under § 504). However, the Supreme Court's recent holding on the re-
lated issue of attorneys fees under the Act in Smith v. Robinson, 104 S.Ct. 3457 (1984),
may severely limit plaintiffs' opportunities to pursue either alternative route when the
EHA also applies. See also Irving Indep. School Dist. v. Tatro, 82 L.Ed. 2d 664, 675
(1984) ("§ 504 is inapplicable when relief is available under the [EHA] to remedy a
denial of educational services").
7. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2)(1982). The section states:
Any party aggrieved by the findings and decision made [by the state educational
agency], shall have the right to bring a civil action with respect to the complaint
presented pursuant to this section, which action may be brought in any State court
of competent jurisdiction or in a district court of the United States without regard to
the amount in controversy. In any action brought under this paragraph the court
shall receive the records of the administrative proceedings, shall hear additional
evidence at the request of a party, and basing its decision on the preponderance of
the evidence, shall grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate.
Id. (emphasis added).
8. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(3)(1982). The section states: "During the pendency of any
proceedings conducted pursuant to this section, unless the state or local educational
agency and the parent or guardian otherwise agree, the child shall remain in the then
current educational placement of such child. . .until all such proceedings have been
completed." Id.
9. See, e.g., Anderson v. Thompson, 658 F.2d 1205 (damages available where child's
health is in danger or school officials have acted in bad faith); Dept. of Educ., State of
Hawaii v. Katherine D., 727 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1983) as amended (1984) (reimbursement
available where school failed to provide the least restrictive setting); Powell v. Defore,
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have interpreted § 1415(e)(3) as an absolute bar to tuition reim-
bursement for any parents who have unilaterally removed their child
from public school pending a review of his proposed placement,
even if the placement recommended by the school is later deter-
mined to have been inappropriate.' 0
This Comment will argue that the First Circuit's view better ful-
fills both the substantive goals of the EHA and the judicial role envi-
sioned by its authors. In addressing the issue of reimbursement,
this Comment will first consider the Act's constitutional roots, sub-
stantive goals and procedural mechanisms. It will then analyze the
circuit courts' conflicting interpretations of the EHA's relevant pro-
visions in light of their legislative history. It will attribute the courts'
generally restrictive views on reimbursement awards to their narrow
readings of the Act and to their inattention to the adverse constitu-
tional and policy consequences of denying plaintiffs some form of
equitable compensation. In addition, this Comment will address the
largely ignored problem of the handicapped child whose parents
cannot afford to finance even temporarily the education that may
later be found to have been improperly denied by the public
schools. Finally, the Comment will propose a more equitable ap-
proach to the granting of reimbursement awards that takes into ac-
count the right of all handicapped plaintiffs-whether rich or
poor-to receive monetary relief equal to the amounts saved by the
school systems in improperly denying them a "free and appropriate
public education." The Supreme Court can affirm this remedial
scheme in its forthcoming review of Town of Burlington. However,
should the Court reverse the First Circuit, the principles enunciated
in this Comment provide the basis for a legislative clarification and
expansion of the right to tuition reimbursements under the EHA.
I. The History, Goals and Structure of the EHA
The Education for All Handicapped Children Act was adopted in
1975 as the culmination of years of effort by advocates for the hand-
icapped and by members of Congress" to establish the right of
699 F.2d 1078 (i1 th Cir. 1983)(adopting in dictum the Anderson court's approach). See
also Quackenbush v. Johnson City School Dist. 716 F.2d 141, 149 (2d Cir. 1983), cert.
denied (1984)(reserving question on general and reimbursement damages). Cf. Gregg B.
v. Bd. of Educ. of the Lawrence School Dist., 535 F.Supp. 1333 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (tuition
reimbursement available in limited circumstances).
10. See, e.g., Rowe v. Henry County School Bd., 718 F.2d 115 (4th Cir. 1983); Stem-
pie v. Bd. of Educ. of Prince George's County, 623 F.2d 893 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 911 (1981); Scokin v. Texas, 723 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1984).
11. Congress first responded to the problem of education for the handicapped in
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handicapped children to public education. This right was to be im-
plemented by federal funds with minimal educational guidelines to
be imposed upon the states. The Act's firm foundation in the consti-
tutional principles of due process and equal protection is revealed
in its own legislative history and the history of special education in
general.
Historically, the handicapped were largely excluded from public
education. They were often considered to be uneducable and to
possess fewer rights than the nonhandicapped. Then advocates for
the handicapped, inspired by the struggle of other minorities for
equal rights and by medical and educational advances, began in the
1960s to assert the fundamental right of handicapped children to
adequate schooling. These advocates, faced with the inaction of
school officials and their own political powerlessness, adopted a
strategy of litigation to force comprehensive reform of special edu-
cation. The resulting court cases asserted the constitutional rights
of the handicapped to receive public schooling. These cases also il-
lustrated the need for minimal national standards and for federal
financial aid to the states to educate children with physical, mental
and emotional disabilities.
12
Congress responded to this litigation with the EHA. The accom-
panying Senate Report emphasized that passage of the Act "fol-
lowed a series of landmark court cases establishing in law the right
to education for all handicapped children."' 13 The Senate Report
cited the Supreme Court's 1954 desegregation decision in Brown v.
Board of Education 14 as having established the principle that equal ed-
ucational opportunity is guaranteed by the Constitution: "the op-
portunity. of an education . . . is a right which must be made
available to all on equal terms."' 15 In particular, the legislation was
motivated by two subsequent district court decisions 16 holding that
the exclusion of handicapped children from public schools violated
1966 when it amended the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 20 U.S.C.
§§ 236-44 (1982), amended by Elementary and Secondary Amendments of 1966, Pub. L.
No. 89-750, § 161, 80 Stat. 1204, to establish a grant program to the states to further
special education. See Hendrick Hudson Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176,
178-79 (1981) for further discussion of the EHA's legislative predecessors.
12. Tweedie, The Politics of Legalization, in SPECIAL EDUCATION REFORM 48-55 (1983).
13. S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong. 1st Sess. 6, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.&
ADM. NEWS 1425, 1430.
14. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
15. S. REP. No. 168, supra note 13, at 1430 (quoting Brown, 347 U.S. at 493).
16. Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972); Pennsylvania Ass'n for
Retarded Children v. Commonwealth, 343 F.Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972). These cases
arose out of the right-to-education litigation campaign.
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principles of equal protection and due process.' 7 In one of these
pivotal cases, a District of Columbia district court had held that fi-
nancial constraints did not justify depriving handicapped children of
their right to a public education.' 8 The Senate Report rejected the
argument that the federal government could mandate education for
the handicapped only if it provided all necessary funding; instead,
the Report emphasized "the states' primary responsibility to up-
hold the Constitution of the United States and their own state con-
stitutions and state laws as well as the Congress' own responsibility
under the fourteenth amendment to assure equal protection of the
law."19
A second motivation behind enactment of the EHA was Congress'
desire to secure the procedural rights of the handicapped, in addi-
tion to their substantive rights. Accordingly, the Act incorporated
many of the procedures that the landmark cases had required the
schools to follow in assigning handicapped children to appropiate
educational programs. 20 These procedural protections included no-
tice requirements and the right to an impartial hearing. A commit-
ment to the constitutional right of handicapped children to "equal
access" to a free public education, 2' and to the procedural due pro-
17. See S. REP. No. 168, supra note 13, at 1430-40, 1446-47 ; H.R. REP. No. 332, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1975). See generally Rowley, 458 U.S. at 180 n.2, 192-200.
18. S. REP. No. 168, supra note 13, at 1447 (quoting Mills, 348 F.Supp. at 876):
If sufficient funds are not available to finance all of the services and programs that
are needed and desirable in the system then the available funds must be expended
equitably in such a manner that no child is entirely excluded from a publicly sup-
ported education consistent with his needs and ability to benefit therefrom. The
inadequacies of the District of Columbia Public School System, whether occasioned
by insufficient funding or administrative inefficiency, certainly cannot be permitted
to bear more heavily on the "exceptional" or handicapped child than on the normal
child.
19. S. REP. No. 168, supra note 13, at 1446.
20. L. ROTHSTEIN, RIGHTS OF PHYSICALLY HANDICAPPED PERSONS 19 (1984).
21. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 200. The Court in Rowley rejected the view that Congress
intended "to achieve strict equality of opportunity or services," 458 U.S. at 198, but did
find that the "basic floor of opportunity" provided by the Act consists of access to spe-
cialized instruction and related services which are individually designed to provide edu-
cational benefit to the handicapped child" 458 U.S. at 201 (footnote omitted).
Although, as the Rowley Court noted, the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment does not require states to "expend equal financial resources on the educa-
tion of each child," 458 U.S. at 199-200, it does, at a minimum, require "equal access"
to a free and appropriate education. 458 U.S. at 200. Compare Brown, 347 U.S. at 493
(1954)(states that assume responsibility for educating some children must make educa-
tion available to all). But cf. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I
(1973)(education is not a right guaranteed by the Constitution). The Court in Plyler v.
Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982), while following Rodriguez, also stressed that "education has a
fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of our society." Id. at 221. The reasoning of
the court in Plyler, while establishing the right to education of children of illegal aliens,
also applies particularly well to the education of the handicapped:
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cess protection of that right, thus informed the design of the EHA.
Any reading of the Act should square with these constitutional
underpinnings.
Specifically, Congress sought in adopting the EHA:
to assure [the right of all handicapped children to]. . . a free appro-
priate public education. . .designed to meet their unique needs, to as-
sure that the rights of handicapped children and their parents or
guardians are protected, [and] to assist States and localities to provide
for the education of all handicapped children .... 22
The statute serves two main functions: 1) It offers substantial fed-
eral grants to state and local agencies to fund education for the
handicapped,2 3 and 2) it establishes procedural safeguards for hand-
icapped children and their parents,2 4 requiring that school systems
allow parental involvement in the formulation of a child's individu-
alized education program ("IEP"), comply with notice provisions, 25
and establish an impartial due process hearing system. 26
The EHA's procedural safeguards are capped by a grant ofjuris-
diction to state or federal district courts to review final administra-
tive decisions. This important provision, § 1415(e)(2) of the Act,
states that "[in any action brought under this paragraph the court
shall receive the records of the administrative proceedings, shall
hear additional evidence at the request of a party, and, basing its
decision on the preponderance of the evidence, shall grant such relief
as the court determines is appropriate."27 Section 1415(e) (2), then, estab-
lishes a less deferential standard ofjudicial review than is tradition-
ally afforded administrative decisions. 28
The inability to read and write will handicap the individual deprived of a basic
education each and every day of his life. The inestimable toll of that deprivation on
the social, economic, intellectual, and psychological well-being of the individual,
and the obstacle it poses to individual achievement, make it most difficult to recon-
cile the cost or the principle of a status-based denial of basic education with the
framework of equality embodied in the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 222.
For discussion of the Rowley decision, see Note, Attacks on the EHA: The Education For All
Handicapped Children Act After Board of Education v. Rowley, 7 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV.
183 (1983); Note, The Education For All Handicapped Children Act of 1975: What's Left After
Rowley? 19 WILLAMETrE L.J. 715 (1983).
22. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(1982).
23. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1411-12 (1982).
24. 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (1982). According to Representative Perkins, Chairman of the
House Committee on Labor and Education, the EHA's procedural safeguards were
"designed to further the congressional goal of insuring a full educational opportunity
for all handicapped children." 121 CONG. REC. H37025 (1975) (statement of Rep.
Perkins).
25. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1) (1982).
26. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(2), (c), (d) (1982).
27. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) (1982) (emphasis added). See supra note 7.
28. See Town of Burlington, 736 F.2d at 792 ("The traditional test of [administrative]
findings being binding on the court if supported by substantial evidence, or even a pre-
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The Supreme Court in Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson
School District v.Rowley 29 held that judicial review under the EHA re-
quired a two-fold inquiry: 1) Did the state comply with the proce-
dures of the Act? 2) "[I]s the individualized education program
developed through the Act's procedures reasonably calculated to
enable the child to receive educational benefits?" 30 This standard
presumes that school officials will achieve satisfactory results if they
comply with the EHA's procedures. However, the courts must still
determine whether an IEP meets the particular needs of the child
and, if it does not, must fashion a remedy accordingly. Thus,
§ 1415(e)(2) of the Act gives the courts responsibility for remedying
"unreasonable" educational placements by supplying "appropriate"
relief. The ambiguities inherent in such an open-ended prescription
have invited a number of courts to define narrowly the reach of their
remedial powers.
II. Section 1415(e)(2): The Scope of "Appropriate" Relief
The Seventh, Eighth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have all held
that monetary awards, however limited, are ordinarily outside the
scope of relief authorized by § 1415(e)(2). 3 1 The Seventh Circuit in
Anderson v. Thompson3 2 wrote the leading opinion restricting, albeit in
dicta, a court's power to grant monetary damages to parents who
unilaterally enroll their child in private school after the public
school has made an incorrect placement decision. The court stated
that monetary awards might be appropriate in two exceptional cir-
cumstances: 1) where the child's physical health would otherwise
have been endangered, and 2) where the school agency acted in bad
faith by failing to comply with the procedural provisions of the
Act. 3 3 The Anderson court examined the legislative history of the
ponderance of the evidence, does not apply. . . After. . . [careful] consideration, the
court is free to accept or reject the findings in part or in whole"). But see Karl v. Bd. of
Educ. of Geneseo Central School Dist., 736 F.2d 873, 877 (2d Cir. 1984)("Rowley re-
quires that federal courts defer to the final decision of the state authorities, and that
deference may not be eschewed merely because a decision is not unanimous or the re-
viewing authority disagrees with the hearing officer"). Cf. id. at 878. (Pratt, J., dissent-
ing) ("The majority ... has turned its back on Congress's direction that a district court
should actively review the . . . [IEP] of an aggrieved handicapped child.
29. 458 U.S. 176 (1981).
30. Id. at 206-207.
31. See supra note 9.
32. 658 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1981).
33. Id. at 1213. The Anderson court derived its first exception from the example of
Tatro v. Texas, 516 F.Supp. 968 (N.D. Tex. 1981), affd 703 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1983),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part 82 L. Ed. 2d 664 (1984). In Tatro, the public school had refused
to provide catheterization to a child, thus forcing her parents to enroll her in a private
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EHA to find no express authorization of a damages remedy and to
find other factors that it considered conclusive evidence that dam-
ages were not intended. These factors included "an emphasis on
procedural safeguards to ensure appropriate placements, a recogni-
tion that diagnosis of special education problems was difficult and
uncertain, an awareness of severe budgeting constraints, and an ac-
knowledgment that it would take time for all handicapped children
to be helped." 3 4 The court also relied on policy considerations to
deny a general damages remedy. The Anderson court reasoned that
such monetary relief would not serve the goals of the Act, since
"educational programs for the handicapped will suffer if school offi-
cials, for fear of exposing themselves to monetary liability for incor-
rect placements, hestitate to implement innovative educational
reforms."
35
The Anderson court did not absolutely bar damage awards, despite
such ostensibly overwhelming evidence that they were not within
the scope of "appropriate" relief. Instead, the court apparently
sought to draw some distinction between the majority of situations
in which broad "monetary liability" was considered inappropriate
and the few situations in which courts had found some form of com-
pensation to be essential to the purposes of the Act:
In those [exceptional] situations it is likely that Congress, though gen-
erally requiring that a child remain in his current placement ...
would have intended that parents take action to provide the necessary
services for their children without awaiting the outcome of lengthy ad-
ministrative and judicial proceedings. Parents should then be com-
pensated for the costs of obtaining those services that the school
district was required to provide.
3 6
The Anderson opinion demonstrates the way in which many fed-
eral courts have narrowed their remedial authority to guarantee the
rights of handicapped children under the Act.3 7 The broad lan-
school. Anderson, 658 F.2d at 1213-14. It derived the second exception from Congress's
general intent in enacting procedural safeguards under the EHA. Id. at 1214. Cf
Monahan v. Nebraska, 491 F.Supp. 1074, 1094 (D.Neb. 1980), affd in part, rev'd in part
645 F.2d 595 (8th Cir. 1981) (tuition reimbursement available in circumstances of de-
fendant's failure to comply with the procedural provisions of § 1415(e)(2) in an egre-
gious fashion). The Anderson court suggested these two exceptions in dicta, finding that
since neither exception existed in this case, no monetary award could be granted.
34. Anderson, 658 F.2d at 1213.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See generally Rowley, 458 U.S. at 183 ("Compliance [with the EHA] is as-
sured. . .by the provision for judicial review"); Town of Burlington, 736 F.2d at 792
("school systems have a set of affirmative obligations that are to be discharged under the
scrutiny of state educational agencies, and only as a last resort, the federal and state
courts").
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guage of § 1415(e)(2) could just as readily be interpreted as afford-
ing tuition reimbursement when a parent has correctly defied the
school's placement recommendation. This provision interposes the
courts as the crucial check on the traditionally wide discretion of
state and local educators in determining "appropriate" educational
placements. 38 Section 1415(e)(2) grants federal district courts con-
current jurisdiction over EHA claims regardless of the amount in
controversy, 39 provides for judicial review of administrative deci-
sions to determine whether the requirements of the Act have been
met, and empowers the courts not merely to affirm or remand ad-
ministrative decisions but rather to exercise their own judgment in
fashioning needed relief.40 The Anderson court's reading of the Act's
malleable legislative history is too little informed by the substantial
role staked out for the courts by the provisions of the Act itself.
Although largely silent on the issue of remedies, the Act's legisla-
tive history also indicates that monetary reimbursements would not
be inappropriate. The conference committee, in forging a compro-
mise between the Senate bill, which made no mention of the matter,
and the House bill, which had a different version of the provision,
phrased the bill in a form that imposed no limitation on the mode of
relief. The conference committee version broadly states that: "the
court. . .shall grant all appropriate relief.''41 The Anderson court dis-
missed this language as merely indicative of the courts' freedom to
formulate an appropriate educational program. 4 2 This view, how-
ever, creates an artificial distinction between the power of a court to
38. The EHA strikes a balance between preserving state and local autonomy in the
field of education and mandating minimal federal standards as a prerequisite to the re-
ceipt of federal funds. See, e.g., Rowley, 458 U.S. at 183 ("although the Act leaves to the
States the primary responsibility for developing and executing educational programs for
handicapped children, it imposes significant requirements to be followed in the dis-
charge of that responsibility"). The First Circuit characterized the federal-state relation-
ship established by the Act as "cooperative federalism," Town of Burlington, 736 F.2d at
784 ("while compliance with the minimum standards set out by the federal Act is
mandatory for the receipt of federal financial assistance,. . the Act does not presume to
impose nationally a uniform approach to the education of children with any given disa-
bility"). See also Hyatt, Litigating the Rights of Handicapped Children to an Appropriate Educa-
tion: Procedures and Remedies, 29 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1, 6 (1981) ("The [EHA] attempts to
avoid usurping the rights of educators to determine and effectuate the content of educa-
tional programs").
39. See also 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(4) (1982) (reiterates district court's jurisdiction re-
gardless of amount in controversy).
40. See Town of Burlington, 736 F.2d at 791 ("Congress intended courts to make
bounded, independent decisions").
41. S. REP. No. 455, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 50 (1975) (emphasis added) See Boxall v.
Sequoia Union High School Dist., 464 F.Supp. 1104, 1112 (N.D. Cal. 1979) ("This state-
ment suggests very strongly that, when appropriate, compensatory damages may be
awarded.").
42. Anderson, 658 F.2d at 1211-12.
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order a prospective placement at public expense and the presumed
powerlessness of a court to determine that the past placement se-
lected by the parents was appropriate and chargeable to the public
coffers .43
Furthermore, Congress recognized in adopting the EHA that
merely establishing the right of handicapped children to public edu-
cation was not enough. Rather, access to courts with remedial pow-
ers was essential to enforcing the constitutionally-grounded rights
of handicapped children. Senator Humphrey, a cosponsor of the
EHA, asserted that the Act would "mandate provisions of full due
process guarantees to all handicapped children and their parents."
Citing the two landmark court decrees motivating enactment of the
EHA, Senator Humphrey further asserted that "the progress toward
establishing the right and the remedy for handicapped children has
continued, leaving clear today that this right is no longer ques-
tioned." 44 Absent a comprehensive remedial scheme that includes
reimbursements, the handicapped child's fundamental statutory en-
titlement to a "free and appropriate public education" is called into
question. Although Congress may have precluded punitive dam-
ages in recognition of the experimental nature of handicapped edu-
cation and of the fiscal burden of providing education for all
handicapped children, 45 limited reimbursement awards grant indi-
vidual plaintiffs nothing more than their fundamental statutory enti-
tlement to a "free and appropriate public education."
The Anderson decision does, however, contain the seeds of a more
43. Since the eleventh amendment immunizes states from retroactive monetary
damages awards, Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 678 (1974), plaintiffs are advised to
seek recovery from lower level educational agencies. See, e.g., Miener v. Missouri, 673
F.2d at 980 (eleventh amendment bars actions for damages against the state and state
agencies, but not against counties and school boards). Cf. Katherine D., 727 F.2d at 818
(state waived its eleventh amendment immunity when it chose to participate in the feder-
ally funded and regulated program).
44. 121 CONG. REC. S19505 (1975) (statement by Sen. Humphrey) (emphasis
added).
45. Strong policy considerations militate against allowing tort liability damages
under the EHA. See Loughran v. Flanders, 470 F.Supp. 110, 115 (D. Conn. 1979) (deny-
ing private damages remedy justified because otherwise "[i]nsulation of school officials
from liability would take precedence over the implementation of innovative educational
reforms"). The Act's legislative history reveals congressional sensitivity to this problem.
121 CONG. REC. H25531 (1975) (statement of Rep. Lehman) ( "no one really knows
what a learning disability is"). However, it is important to distinguish between tort dam-
ages and reimbursement of amounts saved by schools: the latter would not hinder "in-
novative educational reforms" or impose an undue burden on public school systems.
See also Hyatt, supra note 38, at 43-49. (delineating distinction between "Type I dam-
ages" (i.e., reimbursement for expenses of appropriate education) and "Type II dam-
ages" (i.e., compensation for the harm from deprivation of a "free and appropriate
public education") and arguing that the former should be available under the Act).
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generous judicial attitude toward the availability of monetary relief
under the EHA. Despite concluding that only declaratory and in-
junctive remedies were intended by the drafters of the Act, the Sev-
enth Circuit swiftly carved out two exceptions to this rule46 on the
ground that Congress could not have intended such an otherwise
harsh result. Implicit in these exceptions is the court's recognition
that, regardless of the inexplicit language and legislative history of
§ 1415(e)(2), monetary compensation may sometimes be the only
fair remedy and that in such cases courts have the duty to grant such
relief.
One circuit has claimed to follow the Anderson holding while ex-
panding its indistinct borders. The Ninth Circuit has added a third
exceptional circumstance allowing tuition reimbursements where a
child was without explanation wrongly denied placement in the least
restrictive classroom setting.47 In reaching this conclusion, the
Ninth Circuit looked to the "fundamental scheme and purpose of
the Act" to discover a strong congressional preference for "main-
streaming" handicapped children-that is, for placing them in
classes with non-handicapped children. This congressional prefer-
ence was held to justify the reimbursement of parents who unilater-
ally decided to enroll their daughter in private school rather than to
keep her in the homebound program prescribed by the school
system. 4
8
Even under an expansive reading of the Anderson doctrine, condi-
tioning reimbursement on a finding of exceptional circumstances
continues to produce inequities. First, parents must bear the bur-
den of ascertaining whether their situation is so "exceptional" as to
permit reimbursement. For example, they must divine when school
officials' conduct meets the legal definition of bad faith and hence
justifies a private placement. Parents also have the burden of prov-
ing exceptional circumstances after the fact to the hearing officer or
judge. Second, schools have little disincentive to put their costs
ahead of the child's needs in making placement decisions or to pro-
long the already lengthy review process before administrative agen-
cies or courts. The school district often stands to gain financially by
acting in everything short of demonstrably bad faith in delaying pay-
ment for an appropriate placement. 49 Finally, the Anderson doctrine
also unfairly differentiates between those handicapped children who
46. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
47. Katherine D., 727 F.2d at 817.
48. Id.
49. See Doe v. Brookline School Comm., 722 F.2d 910, 920-21 (1st Cir. 1983).
288
Vol. 3:277, 1984
Education of the Handicapped
were the victims of bad faith and those who were not. Both classes
of children, absent parental intervention, may suffer the same inju-
ries from inadequate schooling.
III. Section 1415(e)(3): A Procedural Shackle?
Some courts have further narrowed the scope of what they con-
sider "appropriate" relief by their interpretation of § 1415(e)(3).
This provision generally requires that children remain in their cur-
rent setting pending review of the placement decision. The Fourth
and Fifth Circuits have held that § 1415(e)(3) is an absolute bar to
recovery of tuition costs. 50 For example, the Fourth Circuit refused
in the oft-cited case of Stemple v. Board of Education of Prince George's
County51 to entertain a claim for tuition reimbursement because the
parents had unilaterally removed their child from a disputed place-
ment in public school. The court held that § 1415(e)(3)
creates a duty on the part of parents who avail themselves of the hear-
ing and review provisions . . . to keep their child in his current educa-
tional assignment while the hearing and review provisions are
pending. . .Of course, that duty may not be totally enforceable by the
state, but it certainly negates any right on the part of parents, in viola-
tion of the duty. . ., to elect unilaterally to place their child in private
school and recover the tuition costs thus incurred.
52
The court based its construction of § 1415(e)(3) on a literal reading
of the statutory language, buttressed by analogy to the familiar
"concept of preserving the status quo. . . pending litigation at the
administrative and judicial level." 5 3
However, § 1415(e)(3) should not determine the availability of tu-
ition reimbursement for parents who have unilaterally and correctly
placed their handicapped child in a private interim setting. The lan-
guage of the section concededly indicates a strong congressional
preference for maintaining the status quo pending final review. How-
ever, this section need not be read as an inflexible requirement that a
parent acquiesce to an improper placement throughout the lengthy
administrative and judicial appeal process. 54 Such a reading would
undermine the Act's scheme of parental participation in safeguard-
50. See supra note 10.
51. 623 F.2d 893 (4th Cir. 1980).
52. Id. at 897,followed in Rowe v. Henry County School Bd., 718 F.2d 115 (4th Cir.
1983).
53. Stemple, 623 F.2d at 898.
54. The Supreme Court pointed out in a footnote in Rowley that "U]udicial review
invariably takes more than nine months to complete, not to mention the time consumed
during the preceding state administrative hearings." Rowley, 458 U.S. at 186-87 n.9.
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ing their child's right to a free and appropriate public education. 55
The Act prescribes detailed procedural guidelines to be followed by
local schools in involving parents in the placement process. In ad-
dition, parents who dispute a school's placement of their child are
entitled to an independent placement evaluation at public expense un-
less the initial placement is upheld at a due process hearing.56
Thus, the Act encourages parents to protect their child's interests
and even to take the initiative in challenging school placements. In-
deed, the Act's procedural safeguards were primarily designed to
"enforce legal entitlements and also [to] provide [parents] political
leverage within the school." 57 Effectively barring parents from en-
rolling their child in private school-when that is the only appropri-
ate placement-precludes them from performing their statutory
role in the protection of their child's educational rights.
There is little legislative history relating directly to § 1415(e)(3);
however, the Conference Committee did report that:
[T]he provisions of existing law with respect to the binding effect of
due process hearings and appropriate administrative and judicial re-
view of such hearings are clarified and language is also adopted to re-
quire that during the pendency of any administrative or judicial
proceedings regarding a complaint, unless the State or local educa-
tional agency and the parents or guardian of the child otherwise agree,
the child involved in the complaint shall remain in his or her present
educational placement ... .58
The only additional reference to that section in the legislative his-
tory, although somewhat ambiguous, suggests that the section need
not impose an absolute bar on reimbursement of a parent who has
acted unilaterally. In explaining § 1415(e)(3), Senator Stafford, a
conference committee member and the ranking minority member of
the subcommittee on the handicapped, reported: "[W]e did feel,
however, that the placement or change of placement should not be
unnecessarily delayed while long and tedious administrative appeals
were being exhausted. Thus, the conference adopted a flexible ap-
55. See EHA § 1415(a)-(d). The EHA gives parents and guardians significant oppor-
tunities for participation throughout the administrative process. See also S. REP. No. 168,
supra note 13, at 12 (1975)(according to the Senate subcommittee on the handicapped,
the "individualized planning conferences are a way to provide parent involvement and
protection to assure that appropriate services are provided to a handicapped child");
Rowley, 458 U.S. at 209 ("parents and guardians will not lack ardor in seeking to ensure
that handicapped children receive all of the benefits to which they are entitled by the
Act")(footnote omitted).
56. 34 C.F.R. § 300.503(b) (1984).
57. Tweedie, supra note 12, at 62.
58. S. REP. No. 455, supra note 41, at 50.
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proach to try to meet the needs of both the child and the State." 59
This "flexible approach" thus allows for compromise between par-
ents and school agencies in formulating an interim placement and
recognizes a handicapped child's pressing need for education re-
gardless of the status of the appeal. Consequently, § 1415(e)(3) as-
sures both that the child can remain in his current placement at
public expense even if the school agency disagrees with it and that
the school need not fund a new program until it is finally deter-
mined to be appropriate for the child. This strikes a balance be-
tween the paramount need to provide an appropriate education to a
handicapped child and the lesser need to prevent unnecessary ex-
penditures of limited public funds. No public expenditure need be
made where parents' unilateral placement decisions are proven
wrong in administrative or judicial proceedings.
In addition, interpreting § 1415(e)(3) as foreclosing all such reim-
bursement infringes the parents' substantial constitutional interest
in the upbringing of their child. The Stemple court's recognition that
the duty to maintain the status quo "may not be totally enforceable
by the state" is presumably a concession to the well-established con-
stitutional principle that a parent's right to educate her child in pri-
vate schools may not be abridged. 60 In light of this principle,
however, the court's use of the word "totally" is a troubling indica-
tion of its lack of regard for the value of parental discretion in acting
to secure the best interests of a child.6' The court also emphasizes
59. 121 CONG. REC. S37412 (1975) (statement by Senator Stafford)(emphasis ad-
ded). See also Doe v. Brookline School Comm., 722 F.2d 910, 918 (1st Cir. 1983).
60. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)(parents have right to enroll their
children in private schools). See also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1922)(parents
have right to enroll their children in private foreign language classes).
61. See generally Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535 (parents "have the right, coupled with the high
duty, to recognize and prepare [their children] for additional obligations"); Parham v.
J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 ("Our jurisprudence historically has reflected western civilization
concepts of the family as a unit with broad parental authority over minor chil-
dren. . .[H]istorically [the law] has recognized that natural bonds of affection lead par-
ents to act in the best interests of their children"); Goldstein, Medical Care for the Child at
Risk: On State Supervision of Parental Autonomy, 86 YALE L.J. 645, 645 (1977) ("To be an
adult who is a parent is to be presumed in law to have the capacity, authority, and responsi-
bility to determine and to do what is good for one's children");J. CHAMBERS & W. HART-
MAN, SPECIAL EDUCATION POLICIES 61 (1983) (referring specifically to the motivation
behind creating the EHA's parental role: "The value of individualized planning de-
pends on including an effective advocate for the child in the planning process and en-
forcing the child's plan. . .[s]o [policy makers] empowered parents to act in the child's
interest."). But see Parham, 442 U.S. at 603 ("Nonetheless, we have recognized that a
state is not without constitutional control over parental discretion in dealing with chil-
dren when their physical or mental health is jeopardized"). Of course, the state is not
constitutionally required to finance the schooling when a parent exercises her right to
privately educate her child, unless a statute like the EHA mandates that an appropriate
private placement for the child be publicly funded.
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the importance of the Act's procedural safeguards as "a generous
bill of rights for parents, guardians, and surrogates of handicapped
children." 62 However, its interpretation of § 1415(e)(3) in effect
turns the Act's "bill of rights" into a procedural shackle that unnec-
essarily restricts the parents of handicapped children. Under the
rule expressed in Stemple, and reiterated by the Fifth Circuit,63
schools bear no monetary risk for prescribing an improper-even
harmful-placement for a handicapped child; meanwhile, parents
bear all the cost of providing their child with an appropriate educa-
tion pending final vindication of their decision. Such a literal read-
ing of § 1415(e)(3) ultimately deprives handicapped children of
their right to appropriate schooling. This interpretation, as the First
Circuit recognized, "exalts form over substance [and] treats these
special needs children as though they were nonperishable commodi-
ties able to be warehoused until the termination of in rem
proceedings.' 64
IV. A Better Approach to Reimbursement
The First Circuit has rejected both the absolute bar on reimburse-
ments of the Stemple court and the special circumstances limitation
on reimbursements of the Anderson court. Instead, the First Circuit
has applied its own solution to the problem in a body of case law
culminating in Town of Burlington.65 These cases establish that
§§ 1415(e)(2) and 1415(e)(3) do not bar reimbursement of "interim
educational and related expenses" to parents who correctly place
their handicapped child in private school 66 even absent the "excep-
tional circumstances" identified in Anderson.67
62. Stemple, 623 F.2d at 898.
63. See, e.g., Scokin, 723 F.2d at 439 ("parents are not allowed to recover costs in-
curred by actions in violation of § 1415(e)(3)"); Marvin H. v. Austin Ind. School Dist.,
714 F.2d 1348 (5th Cir. 1983). Cf. Zvi D. v. Ambach, 694 F.2d 904 (2d Cir. 1982). The
court held in Zvi D. that § 1415(e)(3) acts as an automatic preliminary injunction, 694
F.2d at 906, but "express[ed] no view whether Zvi D. could recover his tuition costs as
damages ifjudicial review determined that the recommended public placement was not
appropriate." 694 F.2d at 908 n.8.
64. Town of Burlington, 736 F.2d at 798.
65. See Hurry v. Jones, 734 F.2d 879 (1st Cir. 1984) (parents entitled to reimburse-
ment of expenses); Doe v. Anrig, 728 F.2d 30 (1st Cir. 1984) (reimbursement available
even when Anderson exceptional circumstances not present); Doe v. Brookline School
Comm., 722 F.2d 910 (1st Cir. 1983) (§ 1415(e)(3) does not preempt judicial powers of
equity); Blomstrom v. Massachusetts Dep't of Educ., 532 F.Supp. 707 (D. Mass. 1982)
(§§ 1415(e)(2) and 1415(e)(3) permit reimbursement).
66. Town of Burlington, 736 F.2d at 795-99. See also Brookline, 722 F.2d at 918
(§ 1415(e)(3) does not establish a duty that parents maintain the status quo).
67. Hurry, 734 F.2d at 883. See Doe v. Anrig, 728 F.2d 30 (1st Cir. 1984); Brookline,
722 F.2d at 920-21 ("the best approach to this issue is to require each party to bear the
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Allowing reimbursement in such cases will allocate the costs of
education to the party who sought to provide the child with the ap-
propriate schooling, not to the party who adhered more rigidly to an
important, but not necessarily inflexible, set of procedures. This ap-
proach does not impose any undue financial burden on school sys-
tems, since the schools pay no more than they would have had the
child been properly placed at the outset.68 The EHA's "fundamen-
tal" purpose-to provide children with an appropriate education re-
gardless of their handicap-is thereby significantly advanced.
Even the First Circuit's rule fails to take into account the rights of
all handicapped children. Under its rule, monetary relief is available
only to parents who can afford the cost of private schooling pending
judicial review of the placement decision. Denying monetary relief
to parents who cannot meet these costs disregards the right of
their children to equal treatment under the EHA. If monetary dam-
ages are based solely on the expenses that parents incur, school offi-
cials will have less incentive to fulfill their statutory responsibilities
to low-income children than to more affluent children. Therefore,
to protect the constitutional and statutory rights of all handicapped
students, the courts should allow any child placed in an improper
program to recover the amount that the school district saved
through its own error. This remedy would apply to any child de-
monstrably harmed by the school's inappropriate placement. 69 This
approach, consistent with the familiar doctrine of unjust enrich-
ment,70 would not unduly burden budgets for handicapped educa-
costs of its own errors ofjudgment in determining what a [free and appropriate public
education] for a child requires in the pertinent circumstances. . .[P]ermitting reim-
bursement promotes the purpose and policy of the Act.").
68. See Brookline, 722 F.2d at 921, and Hyatt, supra note 38, at 50.
69. See Hyatt, supra note 38, at 50. See also Hyatt at 48:
The resources possessed by parents who make other arrangements for their child
are not limited to dollars but also include the possession of sophisticated informa-
tion about the child's handicap, available educational services and alternative place-
ments. Thus, the more well-to-do, knowledgeable parents will avoid injury to their
child and will be able to recover their costs of doing so, while the child of poorer,
less sophisticated parents suffers the harm and has no redress.
70. A Rhode Island district court applied the doctrine of unjust enrichment in a case
where a school failed to provide a handicapped child transportation, so the child could
not attend school. Hurry, 560 F.Supp. 500, rev'd 734 F.2d. 879. The court awarded the
child the equivalent of the amount that the defendant school saved on tuition. Hurry,
560 F.Supp. at 508 ( "The savings which accrued to Defendants are ill-gotten gains
which should be denied them"). The First Circuit rejected this equitable remedy under
the Act because: 1) of difficulties in calculating the amount saved, 2) the money paid to
the plaintiff would decrease the amount available to other handicapped children rather
than come out of the pockets of school officials, and 3) in cases like this one, the remedy
would provide parents with an incentive to keep the child at home rather than seek a
private placement. 734 F.2d at 885.
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tion: The school system would lose only the money that it had
saved by violating its legal duties. The money currently saved by
denying poor handicapped children a "free and appropriate public
education" most likely reverts to the general pool of funds for
handicapped education. However, the individual handicapped
child should not on the basis of her parents' income be forced to
forgo her statutory and constitutional rights in order to benefit
other handicapped children.
V. Conclusion
The EHA's fundamental goal of providing all handicapped chil-
dren with a "free and appropriate public education," its emphasis
on parental involvement in furthering that goal, and its broad grant
of remedial authority to the courts justify the forms of relief pro-
posed in this Comment. The Supreme Court should resolve the dis-
pute among the circuits as to the availability of monetary relief in
favor of the First Circuit and thereby make fully enforceable the
right to a "free and appropriate public education." The reimburse-
ment rule should also be extended to low-income children, who are,
in the absence of such a remedy, handicapped by both disability and
poverty. The EHA already provides a strong framework for secur-
ing the rights of the handicapped; however, if the current dispute is
not resolved in favor of the proposed equitable solution, the burden
will again fall to Congress, or conceivably to the state legislatures,
to continue "the progress toward establishing the right and the rem-
edy for handicapped children." 7
1
Susan L. Sommer
71. See text accompanying note 44, supra (emphasis added). The Supreme Court's
recent holding in Smith v. Robinson, 104 S. Ct. 3457 (1984) may bode ill for the First
Circuit's position in Town of Burlington. The Court ruled in Smith that a plaintiff who
asserted a valid claim under the EHA could not also proceed under § 504 of the Reha-
bilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-96 (1982), and that the plaintiff could not recover attor-
neys fees under either § 504 or 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982). This decision was followed in
Georgia Ass'n of Retarded Citizens v. McDaniel, 740 F.2d 902 (11 th Cir. 1984) (attor-
neys fees not available under EHA or Section 504). The application of the EHA in Smith
to eliminate plaintiffs' access to attorneys fees indicates an unwillingness by the Supreme
Court to extend the Act's scope in the related area of monetary reimbursement awards.
Thus, action by Congress or state legislatures could prove necessary to secure the right
to reimbursement in the wake of an adverse holding in Town of Burlington.
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